Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between
February 21, 2012 and August 28, 2012. This collection, written by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting
point.
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 9 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2012).
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CIVIL MATTERS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Federal Communications Commission – Telecommunications Act of
1996 (TCA): T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Charter Township of West
Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2012).
Issue One: The 6th Circuit addressed whether a township’s denial
of a company’s application to build a cellular tower had the effect of
prohibiting the company from providing wireless services, and as a
result, violated 47 U.S.C § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Id. 796. The court noted
that the 4th Circuit determined that “only a general, blanket ban on the
construction of all new wireless facilities would constitute an
impermissible prohibition of wireless services . . . .” Id. at 805 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 6th Circuit rejected the 4th Circuits
approach, “which requires a blanket ban to trigger a violation of the
statute . . . [because it] seem[ed] inconsistent both with the plain text of
the statute as well as the broader goal of the TCA to promote
construction of cellular towers.” Id. at 805–06. The 6th Circuit favored
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Circuits’ interpretation that “the clause is not
restricted to blanket bans on cell towers and that the clause may, at times,
apply to individual zoning decisions.” Id. at 805 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that “the denial of a
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single application can constitute a violation of . . . [the TCA].” Id. at
806.
Issue Two: The 6th Circuit next addressed “whether the ‘significant
gap’ in services focuses on the coverage of the applicant provider . . . or
whether service by any other provider . . . is sufficient.” Id. at 806. The
court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Circuits “have held that no
‘significant gap’ exists if any ‘one provider’ is able to serve the gap area
in question[,]” while the 1st and 9th Circuits have “rejected the ‘one
provider rule’ and adopted a standard that considers whether a provider
is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.”
Id. (original emphasis). The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st and 9th
Circuits because of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC)
“endorsement of the standards used by the 1st and 9th Circuits . . .[,]”
and the FCC’s express rejection of the “blanket ban” approach.” Id. at
807. The court disagreed with the “‘blanket ban’ approach adopted by
the . . . [2nd, 3rd, and 4th] Circuits.” Id. Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded
that “the denial of . . . [a company’s] application prevented it . . . from
filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.” Id. at 807–08.
Issue Three: The 6th Circuit addressed “whether there are feasible
alternate locations.” Id. at 808. The court noted that 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and
7th Circuits have all adopted “versions of the ‘significant gap’ test.” Id.
The 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits “require the provider to show that the
manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in services is the
least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve,” while the 1st
and 7th Circuits “require a showing that there are no alternative sites
which would solve this problem.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with the
2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits in finding that the “least intrusive standard . . .
is considerably more flexible than the ‘no viable alternatives’ standard as
a carrier could endlessly have to search for different, marginally better
alternatives.” Id. The court disagreed with the 1st and 7th Circuits
because it considered their standard “too exacting.” Id. Thus, the 6th
Circuit “adopt[ed] the ‘least intrusive standard.’” Id.
Judicial Review – Proper Consideration of Evidence: Brewes v.
Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 682 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether courts evaluating denials of
social security benefits should consider evidence that was not provided to
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) but was later provided to the
Appeals Council. Id. at 1161. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th,
and 10th Circuits determined that evidence presented to the Appeals
Council should be incorporated into the administrative record, even
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thought it was not initially presented to the ALJ, while the 3rd, 6th, 7th,
and 11th Circuits found that only evidence presented before the ALJ
should be included as part of the final record. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed
with the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, finding that new evidence
submitted to the Appeals Council, should be included as part of the
record. Id. at 1161–62. The court disagreed with the 3rd, 6th, 7th, and
11th Circuits because the Social Security Commissioner’s decision was
only final after the Appeal Council’s decision and not after the ALJ’s
decision. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that district courts may
consider evidence that is not before an ALJ but is later provided to the
Appeals Council. Id. at 1161.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Arbitration – Proper Scope of Judicial Review: Reed v. Florida
Metropolitan University Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether courts must “ensure that an
arbitrator has a legal basis for his class arbitration determination, even
while applying the appropriately deferential standard of review.” Id. at
645. The court noted that the 2nd and 3rd Circuits had considered the
issue, and both held the determination hinged on “whether the parties had
submitted the class arbitration issue to the arbitrator and ‘whether the
agreement or the law categorically prohibited the arbitrator from
reaching that issue.’” Id. at 644 & n.13 (internal citations omitted). The
5th Circuit pointed out that the primary thrust of the 2nd Circuit’s
decision was “whether the district court applied the appropriate level of
deference when reviewing the arbitration award.” Id. at 645 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd
Circuit’s analysis and concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010), requires courts to “undertake an inquiry into the arbitrator’s
reasoning,” which requires “some consideration of the arbitrator’s award
and rationale.” Id. at 645–46.
Federal Arbitration Act – Definition of “Arbitration”: Evanston Ins.
Co. v. Cogswell Properties, LLC, 683 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2012)
The 6th Circuit addressed which source of law should provide the
definition of “arbitration” under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id.
at 693. The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits determined that
state law should control the definition, while the 1st and 10th Circuits
found that federal law should apply. Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with the
1st and 10th Circuits, finding it counter-intuitive to look to state law to
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define a term in a federal statute on a subject as to which Congress has
declared the need for national uniformity. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Thus, the 6th Circuit held that federal law should control the definition of
“arbitration” under the FAA. Id.
ANTITRUST
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) –
Jurisdiction: Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.
2012)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the causal nexus standard is the
proper test for determining if a defendant’s conduct had a “direct” effect
on domestic commerce within the context of the FTAIA. Id. at 856. The
court noted that the 9th Circuit holds that “an effect is direct if it follows
as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The 7th Circuit declined to adopt the
9th Circuit’s “immediate consequence” test, and found more persuasive
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division approach, “which takes
the position that, for FTAIA purposes, the term ‘direct’ means only a
reasonably proximate causal nexus.” Id. at 856–57 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court reasoned that “[s]uperimposing the idea of
‘immediate consequence’ on top of the full phrase results in a stricter test
than the complete text of the statute can bear.” Id. at 857. Additionally,
the court noted that the causal nexus standard ensures that the FTAIA
will “exclude from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too remote
from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce.” Id.
Thus, the court adopted the Department of Justice’s causal nexus
approach as the test for determining whether a defendant’s conduct has
had a “direct” effect on domestic commerce. Id.
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter Eleven – Debtor’s Duties and Benefits:
In re Bandi v.
Becnel, 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed what the phrase “statement respecting the
debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition” in § 523(a)(2)(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code means for the purpose of deciding whether a party’s
debt can be discharged after making false statements. The court noted
that the 8th and 10th Circuits determined “that statements within the
meaning of that section are those that purport to present a picture of the
debtor’s overall financial health.” Id. at 677 (quoting Cadwell v.
Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). The 4th Circuit “held that a debtor’s false representation
[about] certain property he owned . . . was a statement regarding the
debtor’s financial condition and therefore dischargeable.” Id. The 5th
Circuit agreed with the 8th and 10th Circuits and found that “the use of
‘financial condition’ in the definition of ‘insolvent’ suggests that the term
‘financial condition’ in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) also relates to a debtor’s
net worth or overall financial condition.” Id. (quoting Cadwell, 427 F.3d
at 707) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit concluded
that “financial condition” meant “the general overall financial condition
of an entity or individual, that is, the overall value of property and
income as compared to debt and liabilities . . .” and that “a representation
that one owns a particular residence or a particular commercial property
says nothing about the overall financial condition of a person. . . .” Id. at
676.
District Court Sanctions – Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9011: Klestadt & Winters, LLP v. Cangelosi, 672 F. 3d 809 (9th Cir.
2012).
The 9th Circuit addressed whether more flexible jurisdictional
principles regarding the appealability of bankruptcy orders apply to
district court judges sitting in bankruptcy court. Id. at 813. The majority
noted that a previous decision in the 9th Circuit supported it’s holding
that the flexible jurisdictional principles do not apply in this situation.
Id. Additionally, the Court suggested that it was bound by the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional restrictions under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 set forth in Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957), which
precludes the Court from applying the more flexible approach. The 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 5th Circuits agree that different rules regarding the finality
of bankruptcy proceedings should not apply to appeals from a district
court sitting in bankruptcy and a district court’s review of a bankruptcy
court’s decision. Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Discovery Requests: EM Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2012).
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether a district court has jurisdiction
to order discovery judgments against a foreign sovereign. Id. at 205.
The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s conclusion that a
“district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was
insufficient to confer the power to order discovery from a person subject
to the court’s jurisdiction that is relevant to enforcing a judgment against
the sovereign.” Id. at 209. The court reasoned that “such a result is not
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required by the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)]” and is
inconsistent with 2nd Circuit precedent, which holds “that a district
court’s jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign extends to proceedings to
enforce a valid judgment.” Id. Thus, the court held that a district court
has jurisdiction to order discovery judgments against a foreign sovereign.
Id.
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Reverse Preemption: ESAB
Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Insurance PLC, 685 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2012)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether “the McCarran-Ferguson Act
appl[ies] such that state law can reverse preempt federal law [such as the
Convention or Convention Act] and invalidate a foreign arbitration
agreement.” Id. at 382. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit held that
because “the Convention is not self-executing, and therefore, relies upon
an Act of Congress for its implementation,” pursuant to McCarranFerguson Act, “state laws precluding arbitration of disputes with a
delinquent insurer reverse preempt the Convention Act.” Id. at 385.
Conversely, according to the 5th Circuit, “even assuming the Convention
was non-self-executing, reverse preemption did not apply.” Id. The 4th
Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit in finding that “the Convention, not
the Convention Act, . . . directs courts to enforce international arbitration
agreements,” and because the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s text limits its
scope to federal statutes, McCarran-Ferguson could not disrupt the
application of traditional preemption rules. Id. at 384, 388. The 4th
Circuit reasoned that “McCarran-Ferguson is limited to legislation within
the domestic realm” and must be read narrowly. Id. at 388. Therefore,
“even assuming Article II of the Convention is non-self-executing, the
Convention Act, as implementing legislation of a treaty, does not fall
within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.” Id. Thus, the 4th
Circuit concluded that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the state law
does not reverse preempt federal law. Id. at 379.
Qui Tam Actions – False Claims Act (FCA): Little v. Shell Exploration
& Production Co., 690 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether “a federal employee, even one
whose job it is to investigate fraud, [is] a ‘person’ under the FCA such
that he may maintain a qui tam action.” Id. at 284. The court noted that
the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined that federal employees
are persons under the FCA, while the 1st Circuit found “that at least
some federal employees may not be qui tam claimants.” Id. at 286. The
5th Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding
that the plain language of the statute suggested that any person may bring
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a suit and that the language about “private persons” was not meant to
exempt government employees in general. Id. at 288–89. The court
disagreed with the 1st Circuit because the express limitations in the
statute implied “that Congress wished to limit the statute only as
stated[,]” and the court does not have authority to create new exceptions.
Id. at 287. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that federal employees are
persons under the FCA and therefore may bring a qui tam action. Id. at
*2.
Privileged Communications and Confidentiality – Attorney-Client
Privilege: In re Pacific Pictures Corporation, 679 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.
2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether voluntary disclosure of
privileged documents to third parties destroys attorney-client privilege
when the third party is the federal government. Id. at 1124. The 8th
Circuit has adopted a “selective waiver” theory, in which disclosure of
privileged materials to the government for purposes of a separate and
nonpublic investigation results in only a limited waiver of the attorneyclient privilege, while the D.C., Federal, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and
10th Circuits have rejected the “selective waiver” theory. Id. at 1127.
The 9th Circuit agreed with the majority of its sister circuits in finding
that “selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full
disclosure to one’s attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance;
it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government agencies,
thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose.” Id. The
court disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s reasoning that full waiver by
voluntary disclosure to government may discourage corporations from
consulting with independent outside counsel on pertinent issues for the
protection of stockholders, finding this concern to be unjustified. Id.
Thus, the 9th Circuit rejected the “selective waiver” theory and held that
documents that had been voluntarily disclosed to the federal government
were no longer protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1129.
Removal of Cases – Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA): Frederick v.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 683 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a party seeking to remove a
case under CAFA that has alleged an amount less than the jurisdictional
minimum must prove the amount in controversy under the “legal
certainty” standard or the “preponderance” standard. Id. at 1246. The
court noted that the 9th and 3rd Circuits require “the party seeking
removal . . . prove with ‘legal certainty’ that the amount in controversy is
satisfied, notwithstanding the prayer for relief in the complaint.” Id.
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(internal quotation marks omitted). The court further pointed out that the
1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits subscribe to the preponderance
standard, which requires that the “party seeking to remove under CAFA .
. . establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the
evidence regardless of whether the complaint alleges an amount below
the jurisdictional minimum.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The 10th Circuit joined the majority of other circuits in adopting the
preponderance standard, and posited that there is “no logical reason why
we should demand more from a CAFA defendant than other parties
invoking federal jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the court concluded that “a defendant seeking to remove under
CAFA must show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
Statutory Time Bar – Truth In Lending Act: Rosenfield v. HSBC
Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether one can properly rescind a
contract within the Truth in Lending Act’s (TILA) three-year statutory
time-bar by sending written notice of intent to rescind or by “asserting a
defense of rescission during a Colorado Rule 120 Proceeding.” Id. at
1180–81. The 3rd and 9th Circuits strictly applied the three-year
statutory time-bar, holding that “rescission suits must be brought within
three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice
of rescission was delivered within that three-year period.” Id. at 1187
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that the 4th Circuit
recently disagreed, stating that “a borrower must file a lawsuit within the
three-year time period to exercise her right to rescind, as opposed simply
to notifying the creditor.” Id. at 1188 n.12. The 10th Circuit joined the
3rd and 9th Circuits in holding that “notice, by itself, is not sufficient to
exercise (or preserve) a consumer’s right of rescission under TILA.” Id.
at 1188.
Prudential Standing – Jurisdictional or Non-Jurisdictional: Grocery
Manufacturer’s Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 693
F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether prudential standing is
jurisdictional. Id. at 174, 185. The majority relied on D.C. Circuit
precedent in holding that prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue,
meaning that it is always before the court and cannot be waived. Id. at
175. The dissent, however, posited that the majority’s holding “creates a
deep and important circuit split on this important issue.” Id. at 185
(Kavanaugh, C.J., dissenting). While noting that the “Supreme Court has
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not yet directly addressed whether prudential standing is
jurisdictional[,]” id. at 184, the dissent points to decisions of the 5th, 7th,
9th, 10th, 11th, and Federal Circuit Courts, which all held prudential
standing to be a non-jurisdictional issue, id. at 184–85. Accordingly, the
dissent reasoned that the weight of authority indicates that prudential
standing is non-jurisdictional and that a defendant who fails to raise
prudential standing forfeits the argument. Id. at 185. The majority,
however, concluded that “[s]tanding under Article III is jurisidcitonal[,]”
and “[i]f no petitioner has Article III standing, then this court has no
jurisdiction to consider [the] petitions.” Id. at 174.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADEA Preclusion – Equal Protection Claims: Levin v. Madigan, 692
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, precluded a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 equal protection claim. Id. at 616. The court noted that all other
circuits considering the issue have decided “that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.” Id. The 7th Circuit,
however, disagreed with the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits in
finding a lack of “clear or manifest congressional intent” as to the
ADEA’s preclusive effects. Id. at 621. The 7th Circuit compared the
rights and protections granted under both the ADEA and § 1983 to
determine whether the ADEA precludes a § 1983 claim. Id. First, the
court explained that “an ADEA plaintiff may only sue his employer, an
employment agency, or a labor organization,” while a § 1983 plaintiff
“may file suit against an individual, so long as that individual caused or
participated in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights . . . [or] a government organization.” Id. The court also found
relevant that “the ADEA expressly limits or exempts claims by certain
individuals . . . [while] there are no such limitations for § 1983 equal
protection claims.” Id. Finally, the court explained that “[w]ithout the
availability of a § 1983 claim, a state employee . . . who suffers age
discrimination in the course of his employment is left without a federal
damages remedy” because “such [ADEA] claims are barred by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded
that “given these divergent rights and protections, the ADEA is not the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment claims,” and that
a § 1983 claim is not precluded by the ADEA. Id. at 622.
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EVIDENCE
Attorney-Client Privilege – Selective Waiver: In re Pacific Pictures
Corp., 679 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a party waives
attorney-client privilege forever by voluntarily disclosing privileged
documents to the federal government.” Id. at 1124. The court noted that
the 8th Circuit determined that a “selective waiver” theory might allow a
party to disclose documents to the government and not destroy the
privilege, while every other circuit that has considered the theory has
rejected it. Id. at 1127. The court agreed with the 3rd Circuit in finding
that the “selective waiver” is “extending the privilege beyond its
intended purpose.” Id. Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that “given that
Congress has declined broadly to adopt a new privilege to protect
disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government,”
the court would not overstep its boundaries and adopt the “selective
waiver” theory. Id. at 1128.
FAMILY LAW
Child Welfare Act – Case Plan Provisions: Henry A. v. Willden, 678
F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether case plan provisions are
enforceable through § 1983 of the Child Welfare Act (CWA). Id. at
1006. The court noted that the majority of circuits hold that case plan
provisions are enforceable through § 1983 of the CWA because such
provisions contain sufficient “rights-creating language” described in
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). The 9th Circuit split from
the 11th Circuit which held that case plan provisions cannot be enforced
under a § 1983 cause of action. Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1008. The 9th
Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in finding that the
unambiguous language of the CWA revealed a congressional intent to
create a right enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 1009. Thus, the 9th
Circuit concluded case plan provisions were enforceable through § 1983.
Id.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Fed. R. Evid. 501 – Settlement Negotiation Privilege: In re MSTG,
Inc., 675 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
The Federal Circuit addressed whether “communications related to
reasonable royalties and damages are protected from discovery based on
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a settlement negotiation privilege.” Id. at 1339. The court recognized
that the 6th Circuit invoked Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
“fashion a new privilege in patent cases that would prevent discovery of
litigation settlement negotiations related to reasonable royalties and
damages,” while the 7th Circuit declined to adopt a settlement privilege.
Id. at 1342. The Federal Circuit articulated several reasons for not
adopting a settlement negotiation privilege and relied on factors
identified by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1
(1996). Id. at 1343. The court determined that “failure to recognize a
federal settlement privilege [would] not frustrate the purposes of any
state legislation,” and that “Congress’s failure to adopt a settlement
privilege supports our conclusion that no privilege for settlement
negotiation should be recognized.” Id. at 1343, 1345 (internal quotation
marks omitted. Thus, the Federal Circuit joined the 7th Circuit and
concluded that “settlement negotiations related to reasonable royalties
and damage calculations are not protected by a settlement negotiation
privilege.” Id. at 1348.
HABEAS CORPUS
Parole Hearings – Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4210(b)(2) and 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.52(c)(2): Edwards v. Dewalt, 681 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2011)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 4210(b)(2)
mandates the Parole Commission “to conduct case-by-case hearings with
notice to the parolees and an opportunity to be heard” when denying an
award of credit for street time following the parolee’s commitment of an
offense punishable by imprisonment. Id. at 786. The court noted that the
9th Circuit held there to be such a mandate by treating the Commissionestablished regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c)(2), which require a parolee
to forfeit “all street time if he is convicted of a new offense punishable
by any term of imprisonment” while on parole, as an incorrect
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 785. The 6th Circuit disagreed with
the 9th Circuit’s interpretation, but instead found the Commission’s
regulations to be a valid exercise of its delegated authority. Id. at 786.
The court found the statutory language, “the Commission shall
determine,” as giving “the Commission . . . permi[ssion] to make its
determination on an across-the-board basis, if in its discretion it decides
to do so.” Id. It further reasoned that “even when a regulation purports
to ‘interpret’ a statutory term, the regulation may serve as an exercise of
properly delegated discretion.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that the
Commission is not required to conduct case-by-case hearings, and may
establish across-the-board that parolees who violate parole with an
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offense punishable by imprisonment must forfeit street time. Id. at 787–
88.
IMMIGRATION
Naturalization and Removal Proceedings – Immigration and
Nationality Act: Gonzalez v. Aytes, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “district courts have jurisdiction
to review a denial of naturalization during the pendency of removal
proceedings and may issue a declaratory judgment regarding the
lawfulness of such denial.” Id. at 258. The court agreed with the 6th
Circuit’s determination that a district court may not order the Attorney
General to naturalize an alien who is subject to pending removal
proceedings. The court disagreed with the 2nd and 5th Circuits’
conclusions that this determination requires district courts to dismiss
these cases. Id. The court reasoned that allowing declaratory relief
“strikes a balance between the petitioner’s right to full judicial review as
preserved by [8 U.S.C.A.] § 1421(c) and the priority of removal
proceedings enshrined in [8 U.S.C.A.] § 1429.” Id. at 259–60. The
court emphasized that creation of § 1421(c) evidences Congress’s intent
to maintain a petitioner’s right to judicial review of a naturalization
denial rather than vesting full authority to grant or deny a naturalization
application with the Attorney General. Id. at 260. Further, the court
reasoned that declaratory judgment regarding the lawfulness of a denial
of naturalization permits the alien his or her day in court while not
“upsetting” the priority of removal proceedings. Id. at 261. Thus, the
3rd Circuit held that declaratory relief is appropriate in a district court’s
review of a denial of naturalization during pending removal proceedings.
Id. at 259.
Discretionary Asylum Determinations – Immigration and
Nationality Act: Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.
2012)
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adding “social
visibility” and “particularity” as requirements to establish “membership
in a particular social group,” such that the BIA’s decision did not warrant
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. at 519. The court noted that the
1st, 2nd, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined that the BIA’s
“interpretations of what constitutes a ‘particular social group’ are entitled
to deference.” Id. at 520. The court further observed that the 9th and
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10th Circuits had addressed the narrower issue in the case at bar, and
held that “individuals from Central America resisting gang activity . . .
are not members of particular social groups.” Id. In contrast, the 3rd and
7th Circuits declined to apply the BIA’s “social visibility” and
“particularity” framework for “membership in a particular social group.”
Id. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits stating that it “d[id] not believe that the BIA’s interpretation
incorporating the ‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility’ test is an
impermissible construction of a statute that is decidedly vague and
ambiguous.” Id. at 521. The court disagreed with the 3rd and 7th
Circuits’ rejection of the BIA’s framework, but noted that “even the
opinions in our sister circuits that reject the BIA’s framework do not
necessarily support [defendant’s] argument,” because “a social group
cannot be defined by its relationship to its persecutor alone or by the fact
that its members face dangers in retaliation for the actions against the
persecutor.” Id. at 520. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that “the BIA’s
interpretation is . . . entitled to deference since agency interpretations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 521.
Selection System – Revocation of Approval of Petitions: Mehanna v.
United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 677 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.
2012)
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether section 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) [of
the Immigration and Nationality Act] removed [the 6th Circuit’s]
jurisdiction to review the [Attorney General’s or Secretary of Homeland
Security’s] decision under section 1155 to revoke a visa petition” as an
act of discretion. Id. at 314. The court noted that at least seven other
circuits “have interpreted revocations of visa petitions under section
1155 to be discretionary, while the 9th Circuit found that the “power to
revoke a visa petition is not entirely within the Attorney General’s [or the
Secretary’s] judgment or conscience because the ‘good and sufficient
cause’ language constitutes a legal standard the meaning of which we
retain jurisdiction to clarify.” Id. at 315 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). The 6th Circuit agreed with the majority of the circuits
in finding “[t]he statute, when read in its totality, plainly commits the
decision of whether to revoke a visa petition to the discretion of the
Secretary [or Attorney General]. Id. The court disagreed with the 9th
Circuit’s reading of the section stating that it would require “focusing on
the ‘good and sufficient cause’ language to the exclusion of the word
‘deems.’” Id. Thus the 6th Circuit concluded, “the Secretary’s decision
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to revoke a visa petition under section 1155 is an act of discretion that
Congress has removed from our review.” Id. at 315.
Discretionary Asylum Determinations – Immigration and
Nationality Act: Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012)
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adding “social
visibility” and “particularity” as requirements to establish of
“membership in a particular social group.” Id. at 682 (Bye, J.,
concurring). The court noted that the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Circuits
determined that “social visibility” and “particularity” requirements were
inconsistent with BIA precedent, and that the BIA failed to provide its
rationale for their addition. Id. at 685. In contrast, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and
9th Circuits upheld the BIA’s addition of the “social visibility” and
“particularity” requirements, as well as the BIA’s authority to refine its
definition of “particular social group.” Id. The 8th Circuit noted that it
was bound by prior decisions in which it had adopted the findings of the
1st, 2nd, 4th, and 9th Circuits that “‘persons resistant to gang violence’
are too diffuse to be recognized as a particular social group.” Id. at 681.
The court disagreed with the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Circuits that these
individuals are perceived as a distinct group by society such that they
“suffer from a higher incidence of crime than the rest of the population.”
Id. at 680. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that it had no choice but to
hold that the BIA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in requiring that
a “particular social group” be “a discrete class of persons who would be
perceived as a group by the rest of society.” Id. at 682.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Equitable
Relief: CGI Technologies & Solutions, Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113 (9th
Cir. 2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether strict adherence to the terms of
an ERISA plan that disclaims the application of traditional equitable
defenses constitutes appropriate equitable relief.” Id. at 1122 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court noted that the 5th, 7th, 8th, and
11th Circuits determined that, “in balancing the equities, simple contract
interpretation that provides for full reimbursement per the plain terms of
a plan that disclaims the application of traditional equitable defenses . . .
constitutes appropriate equitable relief . . .[,]” while the 3rd Circuit
found “that under § 502(a)(3), the district court, in granting appropriate
equitable relief, may consider traditional equitable defenses
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notwithstanding express terms disclaiming their application.” Id. at
1122–23 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 9th Circuit agreed with
the 3rd Circuit in finding that there was “no indication in ERISA or in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that Congress intended to limit relief
under § 502(a)(3) to traditional equitable categories yet not limit relief by
other equitable doctrines and defenses that were traditionally applicable
to those categories.” Id. at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court disagreed with the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits because it did
“not see good reason in interpreting § 502(a)(3) to recede from the
traditional broad powers of a court in equity.” Id. at 1124. Thus, the 9th
Circuit concluded that “the parties may not by contract deprive the
district court of its power to act as a court in equity in a § 502(a)(3)
action.” Id.
Labor-Employment – Employee Retirement Income Savings Act
(ERISA): Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, 683
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a plan fiduciary can satisfy the
requirements for an equitable lien by agreement if the “specifically
identified property has been dissipated.” Id. at 1095. The court noted
that the Supreme Court, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006), held that one of the “criteria for securing an
equitable lien by agreement in an ERISA action” is that “the funds
specifically identified by the fiduciary must be within the possession and
control of the beneficiary.” Id. at 1093 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th Circuits “have
interpreted Sereboff[] [to mean] that a fiduciary can assert an equitable
lien . . . even if the beneficiary no longer possesses the specifically
identifiable funds.” Id. at 1094. The court acknowledged that the 5th
Circuit has held that “[p]osession is key to awarding equitable restitution
in the form of a constructive trust or equitable lien.” Id. at 1095 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court found the reasoning of the 1st, 3rd,
6th, and 7th Circuits unpersuasive. The 9th Circuit held that a fiduciary
cannot “enforce an equitable lien against a beneficiary’s general assets
when specifically identified funds are no longer in the beneficiary’s
possession.” Id.
Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) – Irrebuttable Presumption of
Complicated Pneumoconiosis: Bridger Coal Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, 669 F.3d
1183 (10th Cir. 2012)
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The 10th Circuit addressed “whether equivalency determinations
were necessary in applying the irrebuttable presumption of [complicated]
pneumoconiosis set forth in § 921(c)(3) [of the BLBA] . . . .” Id. at
1189. The court noted that the 4th Circuit determined that “§ 921(c)(3)
implicitly requires an ‘equivalency determination,’ i.e., a claimant
seeking to prove complicated pneumoconiosis under the ‘massive
lesions’ clause of § 921(c)(3) must show that such lesions would show
up as one-centimeter-or-greater opacities if detectable by chest x-ray.”
Id. at 1187. In contrast, the 11th Circuit found that “[i]t is sufficient if
the claimant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
miner’s autopsy or biopsy results are consistent with a diagnosis of
complicated pneumoconiosis under accepted medical standards.” Id. at
1188. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit in finding that
“[r]equiring ‘equivalency determinations’ in applying the § 921(c)(3)
presumption is contrary to the plain language of the statute and, thus,
inconsistent with congressional intent.” Id. at 1194. The court disagreed
with the 4th Circuit as “the lack of similar language in another part of the
statute indicates congressional intent not to require such
determinations[,]” and “regardless of whether equivalency
determinations are required, the ALJ is not relieved of its obligation
[under § 923(b)] to consider all relevant evidence in making a benefits
determination.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that a claimant is
only required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
“autopsy or biopsy results are consistent with a diagnosis of complicated
pneumoconiosis under accepted medical standards.” Id. at 1194.
LANDLORD–TENANT
Truth in Lending Act – Notification Requirement: Gilbert v.
Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012)
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether the borrower must file a lawsuit
within three years after the consummation of a loan transaction to
exercise her right to rescind, or whether the borrower need only assert
the right to rescind through a written notice within the three-year period”
under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Id. at 276. The court noted that
the 9th Circuit held that “rescission suits must be brought within three
years from the consummation of the loan, regardless [of] whether notice
of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.” Id. The 4th
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit because the plain language of the
statute does not say “anything about the filing of a lawsuit,” and declined
to implement such a requirement. Id. at 277. Thus, the 4th Circuit
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concluded that a borrower need only notify a creditor of her rescission
within a three-year period to exercise that right. Id.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Lanham Act – Standard of Proof: Fishman Transducers, Inc. v.
Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2012)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “to equate fraud or willfulness
with a heightened standard of proof” in Lanham Act cases. Id. at 193.
The court noted that the 3rd Circuit determined that a heightened burden
of proof is necessary to demonstrate intent to deceive, while the 4th
Circuit found that a preponderance of the evidence standard should be
applied to the Lanham Act’s bad faith provisions. Id. at n.7. The 1st
Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit, and found that the application of a
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate. Id. The court
disagreed with the 3rd Circuit as applying a heightened standard because
the Lanham Act does not call for more than a preponderance standard.
Id. at 193. Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded that preponderance is the
proper standard. Id.
TAX
Foreign Tax Credit – Interpreting 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a): Entergy
Corp. & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
683 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether an American corporation is
“entitled to a foreign income tax credit for its subsidiary’s payment of the
United Kingdom’s Windfall Tax” under 26 U.S.C. § 901 and I.R.C. §
901. Id. at 233. The court explained that under 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)
an American corporation is entitled to a tax credit for any amounts that a
foreign government assesses against the corporation as a levy when such
a levy satisfies “each of the realization, gross receipts, and net income
requirements established by the regulation.” Id. at 235 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court stated that the Windfall Tax met the
realization and net income requirements, but the method for calculating
the foreign tax makes unclear whether the levy satisfies the final
regulatory requirement. Id. at 236. The court noted that the 3rd Circuit
determined the United Kingdom’s Windfall Tax “fails at least the gross
receipts requirement of the governing regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a) .
. . .” Id. at 237. The 5th Circuit eschewed the 3rd Circuit’s analysis and
noted that “the Windfall Tax is based on excess profits—realized income
derived from gross receipts” minus deductions for substantial business
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expenses. Id. at 239. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that the foreign levy
satisfies the three net gain requirements for a foreign tax credit. Id.
TORTS
Preemption – State Fraud-on-the-FDA Claim: Lofton v. McNeil
Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, 672 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341
(2001), a state fraud on the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) claim is preempted by federal law unless the FDA itself finds
fraud. Id. at 377. The court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that
state fraud-on-the-FDA provisions are preempted unless the FDA finds
that fraud has been committed during the approval process, while the 2nd
Circuit determined the applicable state fraud-on-the-FDA provision was
distinguished from Buckman. Id. at 377, 78. The court also noted that
the 6th Circuit, in requiring preemption under Buckman, determined that
the state fraud-on-the-FDA provision at issue required proof that the drug
manufacturer defrauded the FDA in conflict with the FDA’s duties, a
violation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 378, 80. The court joined the
6th Circuit’s interpretation of Buckman and held that the Texas tort
reform law, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §82.007(b)(1), is
preempted unless the FDA itself has found fraud. Id. at 380.
CRIMINAL MATTERS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA)
Limitations Period – Claim of Actual Innocence: Rivas v. Fischer, 687
F.3d 514 (2d Cir. 2012)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an equitable remedy for actual
innocence exists to defeat the AEDPA’s, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 1-year
limitations period. Id. at 548–49. The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the
reasoning of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Circuits, which held that because the
statute identifies specific exceptions to the limitations period, Congress
did not intend for courts to apply an additional actual-innocence
exception. Id. at 548. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th,
and 11th Circuits “that the Schlup actual-innocence gateway extends to
claims otherwise barred by § 2244(d)(1).” Id. The court found relevant
the fact that “no court has settled on the contrary conclusion following
the Supreme Court’s decision on a related question in Holland v.
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Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549(2010),” which “demonstrates that traditional
principles of equity continue to have a place in the review of habeas
petitions following the enactment of AEDPA.” Id. at 549. Thus, the 2nd
Circuit concluded that, “absent a clear congressional command to the
contrary, . . . the preexisting equitable authority of federal courts to hear
barred claims if they are accompanied by a compelling showing of actual
innocence survives the enactment of the AEDPA and applies to claims
otherwise barred by its statute of limitations, § 2244(d)(1).” Id. at 551.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) – Transfer of Seized Firearms to ThirdParties: United States v. Zaleski, 686 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2012)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether a district court may, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), order the transfer of seized,
lawfully-owned firearms to a third-party so that they may be resold for
the financial benefit of a criminal defendant, even “after the defendant
becomes a convicted felon unable to possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g).” Id. at 91. The court observed that Rule 41(g) allows a person to
“move for the [seized] property’s return[,]” and “[i]f it grants the motion,
the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose
reasonable conditions to protect access to the property . . . .” Id. at 92.
The court noted that the 11th and 8th Circuits have held that a transfer of
firearms for the benefit of a convicted felon under 41(g) is not
permissible, as it necessarily constitutes constructive possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Id. at
92–93. The court also recognized that the 7th and 5th Circuits have
“suggested that a convicted felon may devise an arrangement in which he
recovers the value of the seized firearms without contravening Section
922(g)(1).” Id. at 93. The 2nd Circuit was persuaded by the 7th and 5th
Circuits reasoning that a 41(g) transfer of seized firearms for the benefit
of a convicted felon does not necessarily constitute constructive
possession if the district court ordering the transfer provides sufficient
safeguards to “in fact strip [the defendant] of any power to exercise
dominion and control over them.” Id. at *9. Thus, the 2nd Circuit held
that the district court was authorized to order the transfer of seized,
lawfully-owned firearms to a third-party for the financial benefit of a
convicted felon without contravening Section 922(g).
Habeas Corpus – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA): Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514 (2nd Cir. 2012)
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether a gateway claim of actual
innocence may also excuse an untimely filing under AEDPA’s limitation
period.” Id. at 539. The court noted that the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th
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Circuits determined that “a compelling claim of actual innocence
constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations period[,]”
while the 1st, 5th and 7th Circuits found that “no such exception exists.”
Id. at 548. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits by finding “more persuasive the reasoning expressed in the cases
holding that an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations period exists
for compelling claims of actual innocence.” Id. The court reasoned that,
“because § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional, it does not set forth an inflexible
rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run.” Id. at 549 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court indicated
that, traditionally, the habeas courts have “equitable discretion to see that
federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent
persons.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 2nd Circuit
concluded “that the preexisting equitable authority of federal courts to
hear barred claims if they are accompanied by a compelling showing of
actual innocence survives the enactment of AEDPA and applies to claims
otherwise barred by its statute of limitations.” Id. at 551.
Subsequent Search – Foregone Conclusion: United States v. Davis,
690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012)
The 4th Circuit held that a subsequent search of defendant’s seized
bag was warranted as it was a “foregone conclusion” that the bag
contained clothing that was evidence of a crime. Id. at 232. In reaching
this decision, the majority relied on 4th Circuit precedent in finding that
an officer’s experience is relevant to determining whether the contents of
a bag are a “foregone conclusion.” Id. at 235–36. The dissent, however,
identifies that there is a circuit split as to the exact scope of the “foregone
conclusion” inquiry. Id. at 270 n.13 (Davis, C.J., dissenting). “The
constitutionality of this corollary to the plain view seizure doctrine is
widely accepted, but there seems to be a circuit split with respect to
whether the ‘foregone conclusion’ analysis incorporates extrinsic
evidence and/or an officer’s specialized knowledge.” Id. The dissent
explains that the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have “instead analyzed
the question from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable layperson.” Id.
Standard of Review – Plain Error Test: United States v. EscalanteReyes, 689 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether, when the law at the time of
trial or plea is unsettled, but becomes clear while the case is pending on
appeal, review for the second prong of the ‘plain error’ test properly
considers the law as it stood during the district court proceedings (‘time
of trial’) or at the time of the appellate court’s decision (‘time of
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appeal’).” Id. at 418 (footnote omitted). The court noted that the 1st,
2nd, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined “the plainness of error is
evaluated at the time of appellate review when the law is unsettled at the
time of trial but becomes clear by the time of appeal[,]” while the 9th and
D.C. Circuits found “that if the law is unclear at the time of trial and later
becomes clear, the error is evaluated based on the law as it existed at the
time of trial.” Id. at 421. The 3rd, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits stated “that
they would evaluate the plainness of error at the time of appeal, although
[the] circuits have not expressly decided the issue of whether this
principle applies when the error is unclear at the time of trial.” Id. The
5th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding
that “the purpose of plain error review in the first place is so that justice
may be done . . .” and the time of appeal test is fairer and “more
practical.” Id. at 422. The court disagreed with the 9th and the D.C.
Circuits because “establishing a ‘time of appeal’ rule would not
significantly alter trial counsel’s incentive to object.” Id. Thus, the 5th
Circuit concluded that the time of appeal rule “presents the betterreasoned view.” Id.
Failure to Instruct – Lesser Offenses: United States v. Lapointe, 690
F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2012)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction for the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess a
controlled substance where “the elements of the lesser offense are
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense[,] . . . [and] the
evidence would support a conviction on the lesser offense.” Id. at 439.
The court noted that the 10th Circuit determined that a defendant charged
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and who seeks a
lesser-included offense jury instruction for conspiracy to possess, “must
demonstrate with separate evidence a separate group conspiring only to
possess contraband.” Id. at 441. The court further noted that the 1st
Circuit disagreed with this determination, and found instead that a
defendant’s being entitled to a lesser-included defense instruction
depends only on “whether there is some core of facts that is common to
the scenario that the government sought to prove and the one that the
defendant claims to show only a lesser included offense.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit,
finding that “a defendant may be convicted, with the same body of
evidence, of joining the conspiracy as to all or merely some subset of the
conspiracy’s objectives.” Id. at 442. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the
10th Circuit’s requirement that there must be evidence of a group
conspiring exclusively to commit a lesser offense since “it is well-
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established that a single conspiracy may have multiple objectives,
including the violation of several criminal laws.” Id. at 441. Thus, the
6th Circuit concluded that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included
offense instruction where there is a “core of facts that is common to the
scenario that the government sought to prove and the one that the
defendant claims to show only a lesser included offense.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Failure to File an Appeal:
Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012).
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an “attorney’s failure to file a
requested notice of appeal” when the defendant partially waived the right
to appeal his conviction and sentence constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 355, 356. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th,
10th, and 11th Circuits and a previous unpublished decision in the 6th
Circuit determined that “if counsel had ignored the defendant’s express
instruction to file an appeal, such action amounts to a per se violation of
the Sixth Amendment,” while the 3rd and 7th circuits have found
differently. Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s reasoning that where a defendant has
made valid waiver of his right to appeal, counsel may ignore his client’s
desire to appeal in order to retain the benefit of a plea bargain, unless
there is a non-frivolous appealable issue. Id. The court also disagreed
with the 3rd Circuit’s holding that waiver is the threshold issue of
whether a defendant can bring an ineffective-assistance claim when
counsel does not appeal after defendant waives appellate rights in a pleas
agreement, and only an informed voluntary waiver is valid to prevent an
ineffective-assistance claim. Id. The 6th Circuit stated that the outcome
in the majority of circuits as well as its own unpublished decisions, “is
the more faithful application of both [United States] Supreme Court and
Sixth Circuit precedent” to the issue. Id. The 6th Circuit reasoned that it
is the “defendant’s decision to pursue an appeal, even if that right has
been severely limited and the outlook on the merits is bleak.” Id. at 359–
60. Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded “that even when a defendant waives
all or most of his right to appeal, an attorney who fails to file an appeal
that a criminal defendant explicitly requests has, as a matter of law,
provided ineffective assistance of counsel that entitles the defendant to
relief in the form of a delayed appeal.” Id. at 360.
Habeas Corpus – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996: Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012)

154

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 9:40

The 9th Circuit addressed whether a petitioner must obtain leave
from a federal appellate court in order to file a “second or successive”
habeas corpus petition with the district court as required by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
when the “second or successive” petition is the first petition challenging
an amended judgment of conviction. Id. at 1126–27. The court noted
that the 2nd Circuit determined that a subsequent petition is not
successive “where a first habeas petition results in an amended
judgment,” even if its claims could have been raised in a prior petition or
the petitioner “effectively challenges an unamended component of the
judgment.” Id. at 1127. The 5th Circuit found such a petition successive
where it “involved the vacation of a conviction and sentence for a lesser
included offense,” which under 5th Circuit practice left the conviction
and sentence intact and did not involve a new, amended judgment. Id.
The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit in finding that procedural
default rules, and not the rules governing “second or successive”
petitions, are “the more appropriate tools for sorting out new claims from
the old.” Id. The court stated that the 2nd Circuit practice aligns with
existing law in the 9th Circuit: “In the context of finality, we treat the
judgment of conviction as one unit, rather than separately considering the
judgment’s components, i.e., treating the conviction and sentence for
each count separately.” Id. at 1127–28. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded
that the latter of two habeas petitions is not “second or successive under
the AEDPA because it challenges a new, intervening judgment.” Id. at
1128.
Statute of Limitations – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA): Marciesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether, under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.S
§ 2244(d)(1), the court should apply a one-year statute of limitations on
a claim-by-claim basis, or whether to consider the habeas petition as a
whole. Id. at 1169. The court noted that the 11th Circuit held that an
“application is timely so long as one claim within the application is
timely.” Id. Conversely, the 3rd Circuit held that the “AEDPA’s statute
of limitations should be applied to each individual claim in a habeas
petition.” Id. at 1170. The 3rd Circuit noted that the language of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations was ambiguous, so it considered the
statute as a whole in determining that the statute of limitations should be
applied on a claim by claim basis. Id. The 6th Circuit subsequently
adopted the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations. Id. In addition, the 9th Circuit noted that it had previously
adopted the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation in a case later vacated on other
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grounds. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 3rd and 6th Circuits in
concluding “that AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations applies to
each claim in a habeas application on an individual basis.” Id. at 1171.
Privacy Rights – Freedom of Information Act: World Publishing Co.
v. U.S. Department of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether booking photos are exempt
from disclosure based on Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7)C). Id. at 828. The 6th Circuit
determined that “there is no privacy interest in a booking photo given
ongoing and public criminal proceeding” and consequently, Exemption
7(C) is not applicable. Id. Alternatively, the 11th Circuit determined
that booking photos are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption
7(C), noting that “mug shots carry a clear implication of criminal
activity.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The court agreed with the 11th
Circuit’s finding that booking photographs are not generally available
which supports a personal privacy interest in the photographs. Id. at 829.
Thus, the 10th Circuit held there is a privacy interest in booking photos
and Exemption 7(C) prevents their disclosure. Id.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Standard of Review – Sentencing: United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d
232 (5th Cir. 2012)
The 5th Circuit addressed the proper standard of review of abuseof-trust sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, evaluating
“whether adjustments under Section 3 of the Guidelines are questions of
law reviewed de novo or questions of fact reviewed for clear error.” Id.
at 251. The court noted that the 1st Circuit determined that, since it is
both a legal and factual question, the court should apply “a sliding scale
of review depending on whether the trial judge’s conclusion is more laworiented or more fact-driven,” while the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits “review the application of the Guidelines de novo and the
district court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id. at 252. The 2nd and
3rd Circuits review the question of whether the defendant occupied a
position of trust de novo, but review the factual question of abuse of trust
for clear error. Id. Finally, the D.C. Circuit found that “due deference is
the appropriate standard of review.” Id. The 5th Circuit agreed with the
D.C. Circuit in finding that due deference “reflects an apparent
congressional desire to compromise between the need for uniformity in
sentencing and the recognition that the district courts should be afforded
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some flexibility in applying the guidelines to the facts before them.” Id.
The court disagreed with the other circuits, stating that their “scattershot
approach” threatens uniformity in sentencing. Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit
concluded that due deference is the appropriate standard of review in the
application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 guidelines for abuse-of-trust sentencing
enhancements. Id.
SENTENCING
Prior Convictions – Applicability of the Modified Categorical
Approach: United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d (2d Cir. 2012)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether § 2252A(b)(1), “which applies
to defendants convicted of certain federal child pornography offenses
who have a prior conviction under the laws of any State relating to
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive conduct involving a
minor or ward . . . . permits a modified categorical analysis of a prior
state conviction.” Id. at 254, 259 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits “all
take the view that only statutes of prior conviction that are divisible into
qualifying and non-qualifying predicate offenses may be subject to
modified categorical analysis.” Id. at 266. The 2nd Circuit deemed the
6th and 10th Circuits’ approaches unclear, and noted that the D.C.
Circuit has not addressed the issue. Id. at 266–67. The court also noted
that the 9th Circuit rejected the requirement of differentiating between
divisible and non-divisible statutes, extending the scope of modified
categorical questions. Id. The 2nd Circuit joined the majority of the
circuits and held that the application of the modified categorical
approach requires that a “conviction . . . [be] divisible into predicate and
non-predicate offenses, listed in separate subsections or a disjunctive
list.” Id. at *46.
Sentence Enhancement – Crime of Violence: United States v. Gomez,
690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether district courts “may apply the
modified categorical approach under the [Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA)],” to determine “if a prior conviction was a crime of violence
for [sentence] enhancement purposes.” Id. at 199, 202. The 4th Circuit
noted from its own precedent that the “use of the modified categorical
approach is only appropriate when the statute of conviction encompasses
multiple distinct categories of behavior, and at least one of those
categories constitutes an ACCA violent felony.” Id. at 199 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court observed that the majority of
circuits to consider the issue hold that where there is no divisible use-of-
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force element under the applicable statute, the district courts may not
employ the modified categorical approach to determine that the use of
force in question was a crime of violence. Id. at 199–00. Meanwhile,
the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuit apply “the modified categorical approach to
both divisible and indivisible statutes.” Id. at 204 n.1. The 4th Circuit
agreed with the majority of circuits based on an understanding of its own
precedent and its reading of Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 203. Thus,
the 4th Circuit held that “district courts may apply the modified
categorical approach to a statute only if it contains divisible categories of
proscribed conduct, at least one of which constitutes—by its elements—a
violent felony.” Id. at 199.
Crimes of Violence – Sentencing and Punishment: United States v.
Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2012)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “aggravated assault” under N.M.
Stat. § 30-3-2(A) qualifies as a crime of violence under the element
prong of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Id. at 558. The court noted that the 5th, 9th,
and 10th Circuits have held that “even a general-intent crime may
include the threatened use of physical force as an element if it includes
the use of a deadly weapon as an element.” Id. The 6th Circuit
disagreed with this conclusion and instead found that “[n]ot every crime
becomes a crime of violence when committed with a deadly weapon.”
Id. The 6th Circuit further explained that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon
may exacerbate the threat of physical force, but does not necessarily
supply the threat if it is not already present in the underlying crime.” Id.
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the “broad definition of assault . . .
obstructs any argument that New Mexico aggravated assault (deadly
weapon) qualifies as a crime of violence.” Id.

